
# Phantoms are not only real

# Discrete Budget Aggregation

n voters, m projects, budget b


#### Input

One vote  $v \in \{0, b\}^m$  per voter with  $\sum_{j=1}^m v_j = b$ 



## Output

Allocation  $a \in \{0, b\}^m$ with  $\sum_{j=1}^m a_j = b$ 



#### Disutility

 $\ell_1$ -distance of vote v to output q

Assumption: all mechanisms are anonymous

#### Axioms

#### Truthfulness

Voters cannot bring the aggregate closer to them by lying about their preferences


#### Single-minded Proportionality

If all voters are single-minded, return the rounded mean

#### Justified representation

If b/n voters agree that a project should get some budget, then at least one of these voters has positive satisfaction

# Example



#### Results

### Truthfulness and Proportionality

Truthfulness and single-minded proportionality are compatible

→ Adapt Moving-Phantom Mechanisms from continuous setting

Truthfulness and justified representation are incompatible

 $\rightarrow$  Computer-aided proof for n = 3, m = 4, b = 3

#### Continuous preferences

Truthfulness and being onto are incompatible

→ Interpret as ordinal voting, use results from dictatorial domains literature [Aswal/Chatterji/Sen (2003)]



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